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Political Crises and Risk of Financial Contagion in Developing Countries: Evidence 
from Africa
Abstract
The recent waves of political crises in Africa and the Middle East have inspired the debate 
over how political instability could pose a risk of financial contagion to emerging countries. 
With retrospect to the Kenyan political crisis, our findings suggest stock markets in Lebanon, 
Mauritius and Nigeria were contaminated. 
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1. Motivation
The  recent  Jasmine  (Tunisian)  and  Egyptian  revolutions  have  set  pace  for  socio-
political unrest in other Middle East and African countries. While they might have been short-
lived, the Ivorian and Libyan crises which have gone on for months now could have dire 
economic  and  financial  implications  for  said  countries  in  particular  and  sub-regions  in 
general.  With much uncertainty on the direction of this  wave of revolutions  and political 
unrests in the months and/or years ahead, the need to assess how such could affect economic 
and/or financial development is crucial. Tunisian and Egyptian stock market operations were 
suspended at the onset of respective crises, leaving little room for a study based on shifts in 
stock  market  correlations.  However,  a  parallel  event  in  recent  history  which  could  help 
researchers  in  the  same vein  is  the  Kenyan  political  crisis  of  2008.  This  study could  be 
charming to investors and policy makers who should be interested in knowing how political 
crisis  in  one  country  might  affect  other  countries  financially.  Findings  could  also  quell 
growing concerns over whether African stock markets are integrated. This paper is organized 
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in the following manner: a review of related literature is seen in section 2; section 3 presents’ 
data and outlines our methodology for measuring contagion; empirical analysis is presented in 
section 4; we discuss results in section 5 before concluding. 
2. Related Literature
2.1 Literature on linkages between financial integration and crises
Though domestic factors have often been seen as sources of crises, financial market 
integration could easily propagate them to other countries and/or markets. Many links exists 
via which such propagation could take place.
Firstly  as  point  out  by  Schmukler  (2004),  with  the  liberalization  of  a  country’s 
financial  system, it becomes an object of market  discipline exercised by both foreign and 
domestic investors. Whereas in a closed economy only domestic investors monitor and react 
to  unsound  fundamentals,  in  an  opened  economy  domestic  and  foreign  investors  do. 
Consequently, the absence of sound macroeconomic, financial and institutional fundamentals 
could increase the probability of crises. Therefore, antagonistic interests and views between 
investors (domestic and foreign) on key fundamentals could precipitate crises and reduce the 
ability to effectively manage and monitor them. 
Secondly,  even  with  the  presence  of  sound  domestic  fundamentals  and  quality 
institutions, international financial market imperfection could also bring about crises. Herding 
behavior, speculative attacks, irrational behavior, bubbles and crashes amongst others could 
be direct implications of such imperfections. For instance, regardless of market fundamentals 
investors could speculate against a currency if they deem its exchange rate unsustainable. This 
situation pointed-out by Obstfeld (1986) has been supported and purported by many authors 
(Schmukler, 1986; Asongu, 2011).
Thirdly,  sound  fundamentals  and  absence  of  imperfections  in  international  capital 
markets  are  necessary but  not  sufficient  conditions  for  the  prevention  of  crises.  External 
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factors (Schmukler, 2004) like determinants of capital flows (Calvo et al., 1996) and foreign 
interest  rates (Frankel  and Rose,  1996) are  potential  sources of crises.  As pointed out by 
Frankel and Rose (1996), the role of foreign interest rates could be crucial in determining the 
likelihood  of  financial  crises  in  developing  countries.  In  the  same  vein,  for  countries 
dependent on foreign capital, shifts in their flows could give birth to important financial issues 
and economic downturns. 
Last but   not the least,  with respect  to Schmukler(2004),  integration  could lead to 
financial crisis through contagion; that is, via shocks through real links, financial links and 
herding  behavior  or  unexplained  high  correlations.  This  fourth  effect  of  integration  falls 
within the framework of our research question. 
2.2 Literature on definition and channels of contagion
2.2.1 Definitions of contagion
To this day, there is no established definition of contagion by economists. Borrowing 
from the World Bank, there are three main definitions of contagion. Firstly,  from a broad 
dimension, the phenomenon could be seen with the general process of shock transmission 
across countries. This first definition takes account of both positive and negative spillover 
effects. Secondly, contagion could be understood as the propagation of shocks between two 
countries in excess of what should be expected with respect to fundamentals after considering 
co-movements triggered by common shocks. It should be pointed-out here that this second 
definition  is  somewhat  restricted  to  only shocks and presupposes  sound mastery  of  what 
constitutes  underlying  fundamentals.  The  last  and  most  restrictive  definition  considers 
contagion as the change in transmission mechanisms which take place during a period of 
turmoil and could be appreciated via a significant increase in cross market correlations. 
In this paper, we shall limit ourselves to the third definition of contagion because :(1) 
our study aims to investigate how a financial  shock resulting from a political  crisis could 
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affect other existing financial markets 1(in antagonism to the first definition); (2) our mastery 
of what constitutes underlying fundamentals in market co-movements we are about to study is 
limited (as opposed to the second definition).  
From an empirical dimension, the third definition was first proposed by Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002). They conceived contagion as a significant increase in market co-movements 
after a shock has taken place in one country. According to them, the condition for contagion is 
a significant increase in co-movements as a result of a shock in one market. To stretch this 
point, if two markets display a high degree of co-movements during the stable period, even if 
they are highly correlated during the turmoil period, if the crisis-correlation is insignificant, 
then  contagion  has  not  taken  place.  The  term “interdependence”  is  used  to  describe  the 
situation with insignificant change in cross market correlations. 
2.2.2 Channels of contagion
Borrowing  from  Schmukler  (2004),  there  are  three  main  channels  of  contagion 
identified in the literature: (1) real link often associated with trade links2; (2) financial links3 
and (3) the effect of herding behavior or panics resulting from asymmetric information. 
2.3 Literature on the measure of contagion
In  the  literature,  many  methods  for  measuring  contagion  have  been  proposed  to 
appreciate  international  shocks  across  countries.  The  mostly  applied  are  cross-market 
correlation  coefficient  measures (King and  Wadhwani,  1990;  Forbes  and  Rigobon,  2002; 
Collins  and  Biekpe,  2003;  Lee  et  al.,  2007),  cross-market  co-integration  vector  changing 
procedures (Kanas, 1998), volatility analysis based on ARCH and GARCH techniques (King 
et al., 1994) and direct estimation transmission mechanisms (Forbes, 2000). 
1 The impact of the political crisis on the financial market is a negative shock and not a positive spillover. 
2 For example when two markets are trading together and compete in the same external market, a devaluation of 
the exchange rate of one country diminishes the other’s competitive advantage. In an attempt to rebalance its 
external sectors, the losing country would in turn want to devaluate its own currency. 
3 When two economies are connected through the international financial system, leverage institutions facing 
margins call could be impelled to take actions that would ripple shocks to other countries. 
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In this study, we shall follow Asongu (2011) in applying Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
in the context of Collins and Biekpe (2003)4. 
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
We reiterate the goal of this paper is to study correlations between the returns of the 
Kenyan stock index and stock indexes of other markets. Taking the Nairobi Stock Index as 
the  base  criterion,  we  investigate  if  co-movements  between  the  base  criterion  and  said 
financial  markets  were  significantly strengthened during  the 2008 Kenyan  political  crisis. 
This crisis began on the 27th of December 20075 and ended on the 28th of February 20086. The 
sample period is partitioned into two sets: a two-month pre-crisis (stable) period and a month 
crisis (turmoil) period. The pre-crisis period begins from the 01st of November 2007 to the 24th 
of December  2007. The crisis  period ranges from the 04th of  January 2008 to the 29th of 
January 2008. We assume here that any substantial price sensitive political implication should 
have occurred after the announcement of the election results (30/12/2007). More so, the full 
crisis period (27/12/2007 to 28/02/2008) is not assumed as the turmoil period because a stock 
market shock was not experienced during the entire period. As presented on figure one, the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) experienced a shock from 04/01/2008 to 29/01/2008. Daily 
data used in the study is gotten from Bloomberg’s database. Our choice of local currency 
index return is because; Forbes and Rigobon (2002) have shown that using dollar or local 
indices will produce similar outcomes. 
4 The hypothesis testing by Asongu (2011) with respect to Collins and Biekpe (2003) is slightly different from 
that of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in that, the test statistics to determine contagion is not calculated using  
estimated sample variances.  Their test statistics (Collins and Biekpe, 2003; Asongu, 2011) uses exact student  
statistics based on actual  sample correlation coefficients.  Contagion is then measured by the significance of 
increase in adjusted correlation coefficients during the turmoil period as compare with the stable period. 
5 Date at which, presidential elections were held.
6 Date at which Kibaki(incumbent) and Odinga(opposition leader) signed a power sharing agreement called the 
National Accord and Reconciliation Act.
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3.2 Methodology 
Contagion as defined by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) is a significant increase in market 
co-movements after a shock in one country7. 
The correlation coefficient is defined as:  
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ρ =                                                                                                   (1)
With:  ‘x’  the  base criterion  (Kenyan  Stock Market)  and ‘y’  a  developing country equity 
market.  According to Forbes and Rigobon (2002), the correlation coefficient is adjusted in 
the following manner:
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  which evaluates the change in high period volatility against low period volatility. While, the 
crisis period is used as the high volatility period, the tranquil period is assumed to be the low 
volatility  period  in  the  calculation  of  this  correlation  coefficient  adjuster.  Contagion  is 
eventually  measured  as the significance of adjusted correlation  coefficients  in  the turmoil 
period versus the stable period. 
Collins and Biekpe (2003) and Lee et al.  (2007) have applied the t-test  and F-test 
respectively  for  the  significance  of  difference  in  correlations.  As  recently  pointed  out  by 
Asongu  (2011),  when  only  one  coefficient  is  to  be  estimated,  both  tests  have  the  same 
7  Based on this definition, the presence of high correlation between two markets during the stable period and 
eventually continuous increase in the high degree of cross market co-movements at the turmoil period is not  
synonymous to contagion. Consequently contagion according to this definition is the presence of significant 
increase in co-movements after a shock. From the same lens, if the high correlation degree is not significant, the  
term “interdependence” is used to describe the situation. 
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implications. Owing to the t-statistics, the significance of increase in correlations during the 
turmoil period (t) with respect to the stable period is defined by:
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with, nt (ns) indicating actual observed days during the turmoil (stable) period.
The following hypothesis is then tested:
0: 21 =− ρρoH  versus 0: 211 >− ρρH
Where oH  is the null hypothesis of no contagion and 1H  is the alternative hypothesis of its 
presence. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Graphical representation of events in the pre-crisis and crisis periods
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Figure 1: Nairobi Stock Exchange Index from 01/11/2007 to 29/02/2008
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As observed from the  graph above there  are  two main  troughs.  While  the  first  is 
considered in the stable period of our analysis, the second fully appreciates the incidence of 
the political crisis. The shock in the stock market eases and ends towards the turn of January.  
It might be interesting to point-out that, the full effect of the shock was somewhat diluted by 
the January-effect8. 
4.2 Empirical results 
Table 1: International stock indexes returns’ conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficients in 2008 
Kenyan Political crisis
Countries
Full period Stable period Turmoil period
ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ t-test Co
Botswana -0.072 0.004 -0.081 0.005 0.034 0.002 0.845 N
Egypt -0.125 0.016 -0.093 0.012 -0.108 0.022 -0.106 N
Lebanon 0.134 0.021 -0.134 0.023 0.249 0.019 3.014*** Y
Mauritius 0.053 0.011 -0.187 0.011 0.222 0.012 3.263*** Y
Morocco -0.384 0.010 -0.263 0.007 -0.120 0.010 1.053 N
Namibia 0.083 0.021 0.191 0.019 -0.015 0.024 -1.529 N
Nigeria -0.432 0.011 0.020 0.006 -0.405 0.006 -3.418*** Y
South A -0.014 0.016 0.139 0.013 -0.143 0.022 -2.134** Y
Tunisia -0.115 0.004 0.099 0.004 -0.096 0.005 -1.450 N
The table shows the conditional (unadjusted) cross market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations for the Kenyan and other stock  
markets. Test statistics is obtained from t-transformations. The stable period is defined as the 2-month pre-crisis period (November 01, 2007  
to December 24, 2007). The turmoil period is defined as the one-month crisis period (January 04, 2008 to January 29, 2008).. The full period 
is the stable period plus the turmoil period (November 01, 2007 to January 29, 2008)   . Contagion (Co) occurs (Y) when the test statistics is  
greater than the critical values. No contagion (N) occurs when the test statistics is less than or equal to the critical value.*, **, ***: represent  
significance  at  10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  (nt+ns-4) degree of  freedom for  the  t-statistics  is  (19+38-4).  σ:  represents  the standard  
deviation. 
Table 2: International stock indexes returns’ unconditional (adjusted) correlation coefficients in 2008 
Kenyan Political crisis
Countries
Full period Stable period Turmoil period
ρ σ ρ* σ ρ* σ δ t-test Co
Botswana -0.072 0.004 -0.119 0.005 0.049 0.002 -0.533 1.242 N
Egypt -0.125 0.016 -0.069 0.012 -0.079 0.022 0.847 -0.079 N
Lebanon 0.134 0.021 -0145 0.023 0.268 0.019 -0.149 3.303*** Y
Mauritius 0.053 0.011 -0.177 0.011 0.211 0.012 0.112 3.071*** Y
Morocco -0.384 0.010 -0.223 0.007 -0.101 0.010 0.425 0.895 N
Namibia 0.083 0.021 0.169 0.019 -0.013 0.024 0.285 -1.348 N
Nigeria -0.432 0.011 0.019 0.006 -0.391 0.006 0.084 -3.27*** Y
South A -0.014 0.016 0.105 0.013 -0.108 0.022 0.764 -1.585 N
Tunisia -0.115 0.004 0.085 0.004 -0.082 0.005 0.377 -1.230 N
The table shows the unconditional (adjusted) cross market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations for the Kenyan and other stock  
markets. Test statistics is obtained from t-transformations. The stable period is defined as the 2-month pre-crisis period (November 01, 2007  
to December 24, 2007). The turmoil period is defined as the one-month crisis period (January 04, 2008 to January 29, 2008).. The full period 
is the stable period plus the turmoil period (November 01, 2007 to January 29, 2008)   . Contagion (Co) occurs (Y)when the test statistics is  
greater than the critical values. No contagion (N) occurs when the test statistics is less than or equal to the critical value.*, **, ***: represent  
significance  at  10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  (nt+ns-4) degree of  freedom for  the  t-statistics  is  (19+38-4).  σ:  represents  the standard  
deviation. 
8 The January Effect is a calendar  related anomaly where financial markets experience prices increase
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5. Discussion of results
As  table  1  shows  correlation  coefficients  increased  significantly  for  Lebanon, 
Mauritius, Nigeria and South Africa during the turmoil period. Botswana, Egypt, Morocco, 
Namibia and Tunisia did not demonstrate substantial increase in variance from the stable to 
the  crisis  period.  But  for  results  of  South  Africa  that  are  inconclusive  with  respect  to 
significant adjusted correlation computations (as presented on table 2), Lebanon, Mauritius 
and Nigeria were contaminated.  As an investment decision implication,  while the positive 
correlations in Lebanon and Mauritius imply negative price-effects, the negative correlation 
experienced in Nigeria indicates investing in the Nigerian stock market in response to the 
Kenyan political crisis would have been beneficial; ceteris paribus. 
6. Conclusion
This  study has  examined  whether  the  2008 Kenyan  political  crisis  influenced  the 
stability correlation structure of African and neighboring stock markets. Using Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) methodology in the context of Collins and Biekpe (2003), we have shown 
that, political instability in Africa doesn’t have isolated within-country financial effects. Our 
findings also support the thesis on growing integration of African stock markets. Though the 
concept of financial  integration has far perceived benefits  of risk spreading and allocative 
efficiency if returns from regional financial markets are stable and not correlated, the event of 
a crash in one market due to a political factor could severely be detrimental to international 
portfolio diversification. Within the framework of our study, while Lebanon and Mauritius 
experienced such negative spillovers, investors in Nigerian Stock Exchange benefited from 
the crisis; ceteris paribus.  
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